In response to criticism directed at the resource sector's corporate governance, this paper examines the corporate governance and underlying firm characteristics of resource development stage entities relative to a size matched sample of non-resource firms. We find that resource DSE's have different governance characteristics in the measures of board independence, CEO-chair duality and CEO cash bonuses. Furthermore, there are differences in the information environment measures of analyst following, debt levels, stock market return and stock turnover. Considering we document substantial differences in underlying firm characteristics, corporate governance differences are likely appropriate to the mining industry and should not be uniformly labelled as 'bad'. Our results suggest that media rankings based on corporate governance scores may not accurately portray the resource sector. Overall, our results are of interest to Australian investors and regulators and contribute to a broader understanding of contextually contingent corporate governance.
Introduction
In a series of industry reports, the resource sector has been rated as having the worst corporate governance of any sector (WHK Horwath, 2009 ). The financial and popular media have cited these reports in drawing attention to the issue: 'Small shareholders are being warned to read the fine print before they invest in small mining companies.' 1 However, is singling out the resource industry for criticism on corporate governance valid? This paper empirically investigates whether Development-Stage Entities (DSE's) in the Australian resource sector have systematic differences in corporate governance compared to similar sized firms in other sectors. Following recent research, we argue that systemic differences in corporate governance are likely explained by the economic characteristics of resource DSE's and suggest that the label of 'bad' governance may not be appropriate (Armstrong et al., 2010; Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010) . 2 This result contributes to the wider corporate governance literature and is of interest to Australian investors and regulators given the importance of the junior resource sector to the Australian equity market in terms of aggregate constituent numbers.
Superior corporate governance is argued to be associated with better firm performance (for example, Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Dahya et al., 2008) , a lower cost of capital (for example, Anderson et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2009 ) and lower seasoned equity offering underperformance (Brown et al., 2009) . Regulators also emphasise 'good' corporate governance, with the ASX issuing best practise guidelines. The financial press also increasingly covers corporate governance, frequently naming the resource sector as the 'worst offender' based on corporate governance scores. 3 The WHK Horwath Rating System awards firms up to five stars based on ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles. However, this methodology implicitly assumes that more corporate governance or greater compliance is 'better' and rewards firms who 'box-tick', regardless of firm specific or other institutional and economic factors. This contrasts with a growing body of academic literature that criticises a 'one size fits all' or 'more is better' approach to assessing governance quality.
Reviewing the literature, Armstrong et al. (2010) highlight the commonly held myth that it is easy to distinguish 'good' from 'bad' for any given corporate governance mechanism. This myth ignores economic arguments and empirical evidence on why firms that are labelled as having bad governance may have, for example, appropriately selected a board with low independence consistent with the firm specific situation. Brickley & Zimmerman (2010) highlight how this myth has extended into two further myths; (a) the myth that it is possible to compute corporate governance scores and (b) the myth that it is possible to identify corporate governance 'best practice.'
Providing empirical evidence that one size does not fit all, Coles et al. (2008) find that research and development (R&D) intensive firms have larger boards and a higher proportion of executive directors. They interpret this finding as consistent with the board's increased demand for inside technical knowledge in order to properly advise and monitor management. Matolcsy & Wright (2007) document that equity-based compensation, an American hallmark of 'good' corporate governance, is far less common amongst Australian firms. They interpret this finding as consistent with the inappropriateness of such compensation schemes for comparatively smaller sized Australian firms. Patro et al. (2009) (Armstrong et al., 2010; Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010) . Therefore, we examine a limited range of corporate governance variables that are commonplace in the extant literature (Brown et al., 2011 
Research design
To illustrate differences between resource and non-resource firms we report descriptive statistics on both corporate governance and firm characteristics. We compare whether the means of resource and non-resource firms for each variable are significantly different using Student t-tests. We also report whether the ranks of variables are significantly different using the Mann-Whitney U test and report z-statistics. This parametric and non-parametric univariate analysis allows us to identify any trends or difference in the corporate governance and firm characteristics of resource and non-resource firms. However, a potential caveat of univariate tests is that they only illustrate significant differences, not causality or associated differences, leaving interpretation open.
To provide further insight on whether there is a difference between the corporate governance of resource and non-resource firms after controlling for underlying firm characteristics, we conduct several multivariate tests. We regress corporate governance measures (CorpGov) on a categorical variable equal to one if the firm is in the resource sector (Resource) and firm characteristics (FirmChar). A significant coefficient on Resource would suggest a difference in the corporate governance of the resources sector that is not explained by the firm characteristics included in the regression. Firm characteristics are excluded where there is potential multicollinearity or other econometric issues. 9 We recognise that causal inferences, endogeneity and correlated omitted variable bias are particularly problematic in corporate governance research (for example, Armstrong et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2011) . However, due to the exploratory nature of this paper and the number of multivariate tests conducted, thorough sensitivity testing and generalisability of specific results is a topic for future research. For continuous corporate governance variables the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is specified as:
( 1) For categorical corporate governance variables the logistic regression is specified as:
(2)
Results

Univariate analysis of corporate governance
To identify any trends, we begin by comparing the means and medians of corporate governance variables between resource DSE's and non-resource firms in Panel A Table 2 .
First, in contrast to media reports, resource DSE's only have marginally smaller boards (means of 4.3 to 4.6 directors). Second, the board independence results (means of 43% and 45% for resource and non-resource sub-samples, respectively) potentially highlight the inapplicability of ASX recommendations and corporate governance scoring systems to small firms. Third, both sectors typically separate the roles of CEO and chairman, but resource DSE's have higher rates of chair/CEO duality than non-resource firms.
Mean cash pay for CEO's is similar, but the median cash pay for non-resource CEO's is almost 50% more (z-stat = -3.018). We document that about half of both types of CEO's have a strong economic incentive to monitor management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and management shareholdings bond their interests' to shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
However, particularly large shareholders can act against the interests of the minority shareholders (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) .
Although ownership concentration does have an effect on corporate governance, it is not a specifically designed corporate governance mechanism and is influenced by other factors.
Therefore, interpreting the determinants of ownership concentration through a corporate governance framework is highly problematic (Armstrong et al., 2010) .
Resource firms also have significantly lower board (excluding CEO) and KMP shareholdings (excluding executive directors). This smaller shareholding could be due to the early life cycle stage of resource DSE's. The lower KMP shareholding is likely a mechanical function of the fewer KMP in resource DSE's as outlined below in Section 3.2, although it also suggests that organisational size is a key driver of total KMP shareholding. However, there are other potential explanations for these results. We do not report regression results for ownership concentration measures due to the lack of theoretical grounding, which makes interpretation of any significant determinants problematic.
Univariate analysis of firm characteristics
To inform our analysis on whether any observed corporate governance differences can be explained by underlying factors, we next discuss the firm characteristics of resource and nonresource firms as outlined in Panel B Second, resource DSE's have significantly less long term debt and leverage, with a mean debt-to-equity ratio of 0.011 for resource DSE' s relative to 0.277 for non-resource firms.
Furthermore, resource DSE's have a higher proportion with negative free cash flows (93% for resource, 57% for non-resource). 11 Consistent with capital scarcity and cash conservation for mineral exploration, resource DSE's have higher current ratios, reflecting their need to raise cash to fund exploration, but similar rates of cash burn (amongst the firms with negative free cash flows). This result is similar to resource DSE descriptive evidence reported in Ferguson (2011) and suggests that debt-based monitoring is very rare and that resource exploration is high risk. As the non-resource firms are matched based on market capitalization, the significantly lower total assets of resource DSE's reflects the lack of debt financing. This is an intuitive result, as typically the only real assets on resource DSE balance sheets are cash and deferred acquisition and exploration expenditure (which is subject to impairment provisions under AASB 6). Resource DSE's also have substantially lower profitability. Therefore, as traditional profitability analysis cannot be performed on resource DSE's, non-GAAP drilling, resource and reserve disclosure likely takes the place of GAAP financial performance-related information (Ferguson & Crocket, 2003) .
Insert Table 2 about here.
11 Of the 57 non-resource firms, 12 were DSE's (primarily from the pharmaceutical development industry), whilst a further 28 were loss-making firms and a further 6 were financially distressed (Altman, 1968) .
Third, our univariate results suggest that resource DSE's have higher stock volatility than non-resource firms consistent with Ball & Brown (1980) . Furthermore, over this constrained sample window, share returns for resource DSE's are higher than for non-resource firms.
This is likely to be primarily a function of the commodity boom but may also be a partial reflection of a small number of distressed firms in the non-resource sample. Share turnover which can proxy for stock liquidity, is also higher for resource DSE's.
12
Fourth, non-resource firms have twice the frequency of analyst following and almost twice the number of analysts (amongst the followed firms). This observation suggests that despite the potentially higher demand for analysts as information intermediaries and a possible monitoring mechanism, analysts are more reluctant to publicly follow resource DSE's.
Although we do not empirically examine this difference, this equity analyst reluctance could be due to a lack of the technical skills (analysts typically have a finance-based education, not geological or engineering-based).
13 Overall, on a descriptive level our results suggest that resource DSE's have fundamentally different firm characteristics than non-resource firms. Broadly speaking, they have less long term debt, more cash on hand, better market performance and lower analyst coverage.
Multivariate analysis
Results from OLS regressions of the continuous corporate governance variables are reported in Table 3 , with both models reporting F-statistics significant at the 1% level and adjusted R 2 12 Once again it is difficult to disentangle the cyclical effects of the commodity boom from the underlying share turnover. In this regard, future research may wish to consider a wider time frame to control for cyclical effects (Ball & Brown, 1980) . Future analysis may also wish to disentangle the effects of non-resource DSE's and financially distressed firms. 13 However, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting this analyst result given the dominance of boutique analyst resource houses which can be excluded from the IBES measure employed here.
above 40%. Furthermore, the Variance Inflation Factor's for the OLS Models I and II reported in Table 3 are lower than 6.8, suggesting no problematic multicollinearity (Lardaro, 1993) . Results from logistic regressions of the categorical corporate governance variables are reported in Table 4 , with all models reporting Chi squares significant at the 1% level and
Pseudo R 2 ranging from 20% in Model I (Majority Board Independence) to 47% in Model IV (CEO Cash Bonus).
ASX Principles
OLS regression results from Table 3 Model I provide further confidence that there is no significant difference between the board size of resource and non-resource firms after controlling for differences in firm characteristics. This is contrary to evidence of larger boards in sectors where highly technical idiosyncratic information might be in greater demand, but consistent with the lower operational diversity of resource DSE's, who, given cash constraints often focus on the development of a single project (Coles et al., 2008) . Total assets and analyst coverage are positively associated with board size, suggesting a strong correlation between firm size or project development and board size. Alternatively, if governance is linked to performance, analysts would rationally choose to follow firms with 'better' governance practises. We interpret the positive coefficients on KMP and negative free cash flow as consistent with board representation of management and creditors. Table 4 Model I presents a logistic regression for boards with independence over/under 50%.
The significant negative coefficient on Resource (p = 0.067), suggests that after controlling for firm characteristics, resource DSE's are less likely to have a majority of independent directors. This result departs from the lack of a significant univariate difference in the percentage of independent directors outlined in Table 2 , but is consistent with the greater proportion of insider directorship documented in other sectors where highly technical knowledge and experience is likely to be in greater demand (Coles et al., 2008) . We also document that lower return volatility and higher turnover are positively associated with board independence, suggesting that the market either enforces, or is attracted to more independent boards. The negative association between return on assets (ROA) and board independence is likely a joint function of the large number of loss making companies in our sample as discussed above in Section 3.2 and that poorly performing firms are more likely to increase board independence (Bhagat & Black, 2002) .
Insert Table 3 about here.
The difference in the duality of resource firms documented by the univariate results is supported by a positive Resource coefficient in respect to chair/CEO duality in Table 4 Model II. This could reflect the importance of technical knowledge in guiding board discussions (Brickley et al., 1999) . However, we cannot conclude this with any certainty and there are other possible explanations such as more powerful or skilful CEO's bargaining for the chairman role (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998) . Furthermore, long-term debt and return volatility are positively associated with chair/CEO duality. This could be due to the large number of firms in our resource sub-sample without debt financing. Alternatively, it could suggest benefits from concentrated control or long term relationships. The negative association between ROA and duality contrasts with literature that poorly performing firms are more likely to separate the role of CEO and chairman (Chen et al., 2008) . The different result is likely due to the greater relevance of non-financial information as a performance measure in the resource sector .
In summary, our results support our hypothesis by suggesting that resource DSE's have greater duality and a lower frequency of independent boards, consistent with other sectors where highly technical knowledge is of greater importance.
CEO Compensation
In contrast to the univariate results, Table 3 Model II finds that Resource is not significantly associated to CEO cash pay, suggesting that the difference is a function of firm characteristics. The regression results indicate that the CEO's of more complex, high performing and riskier firms receive higher pay. As discussed above in Section 3.2, resource DSE's have higher market returns, turnover and volatility, consistent with CEO pay being a factor of rationally risk adjusted compensation packages (Conyon et. al., 2011) .
The logistic regression results in Table 4 Model III show that there is no significant difference in equity plan usage by resource DSE's and that equity plan usage is predominantly a function of firm characteristics that arguably represent size, risk and performance. As discussed above in Section 3.2, resource DSE's have higher stock return, turnover and volatility in 2009. This suggests that equity plan usage is appropriate for small resource DSE's, considering that stock market efficiency is a key requirement for equitybased incentives to be an effective bonding mechanism.
14 In contrast, but consistent with univariate results, Resource is significantly negatively associated to CEO cash bonus in our logistic specification in Table 4 Model IV. The negative association between CEO cash bonus and negative free cash flow, suggests that discretionary cash compensation for CEO's is highly dependent on firm cash position. Therefore, lower 14 We acknowledge the difficulty and importance in disentangling the effect of the commodity cycle on stock price performance from managerial influences when designing an effective equity-based compensation system. Insert Table 4 about here.
Audit
After controlling for firm characteristics, the logistic regression results in Table 4 Model V show that Resource is not significantly associated with lower top-tier auditor use. This contrasts with the univariate result in Table 2 and the significantly positive association between top-tier auditor use and employee expense, total assets and analyst coverage suggests that operational size or complexity is a key determinant of auditor choice.
Furthermore, lower top-tier auditor use by firms with less total assets, but similar market capitalization, is consistent with a lower demand for premium audit services amongst firms with a higher proportion of off-balance sheet (unaudited) assets (Anderson et. al., 1993) .
Additionally, the greater value of non-GAAP drilling, resource and reserve disclosure for the resources sector , reduces the value of expensive GAAP assurance.
Lower top-tier auditor use is also consistent with the cash constraints of resource DSE's (Lee et al., 2003) , discussed above in Section 3.2. Therefore, we argue the difference in top-tier auditor use by resource DSE's is explained by firm characteristics, consistent with our hypothesis.
Conclusion
Large accounting scandals (such as Enron, Parmalat and HIH Insurance), as well as the more recent issues with the toxic legacy assets associated with the Global Financial Crisis, have encouraged the financial press to name and shame public companies with perceived corporate governance deficiencies. Despite academic research stressing the complexities surrounding the demand and supply of individual mechanisms within a corporate governance package, corporate governance scoring systems have become popular in the financial press. This paper aims to consider whether the governance choices made by resource DSE's are economically justifiable and reflect fundamental differences in the way industries function. In doing so, we provide a deeper level of analysis of the differences in corporate governance between resource and non-resource firms, as systematic differences are likely associated with underlying firm characteristics as opposed to exclusively non-compliance or mismanagement.
We document substantial differences in firm characteristics. First, resource DSE's typically have a smaller organisational structure as illustrated by fewer management personnel and employees. 16 Second, resource DSE's have less debt-based monitoring, consistent with debt capital being expensive for firms with high operating risk. Third, higher stock market participation for resource DSE's relative to non-resource firms, warrants deeper analysis controlling for the effects of the cyclical nature of the commodity market. Fourth, the lower analyst coverage of resource DSE's, potentially suggests a less developed information environment.
After controlling for firm characteristics, popular metrics, such as board size and top-tier auditor use are similar between the two sub-samples. However, resource DSE's exhibit a higher frequency of CEO-chair duality and a lower frequency of majority board independence. As suggested, this is consistent with the greater value of technical competence in the resource sector. Resource DSE's also have lower cash bonus usage for their CEO's compared to non-resource firms, but similar usage of equity compensation, consistent with cash constraints. Univariate results depict resource firms having lower ownership concentration but results are difficult to interpret.
Overall, we demonstrate that most differences in governance characteristics between resource DSE's and similar sized non-resource firms are a function of differences in underlying firm characteristics and are unlikely to be caused by management intentionally choosing poor governance or non-compliance. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that media criticisms of the resource sector are likely exaggerated and equally applicable to small firms more generally. If poor governance was endemic in the Australian resource industry, the reported strong share price performance of the resource sector sample in this study and more broadly could not be reconciled in an efficient capital market. In light of such evidence, we suggest that consistent with Brickley & Zimmerman (2010) Table 4 presents the results of logistic regressions for a selection of categorical corporate governance variables. Sample consists of 100 resource DSE's and 100 non-resource firms matched on market capitalisation. All variables defined in Table 1 . p -values are matched and two-tailed. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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